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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN AVIATION CASES:
SOLVING THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
DILEMMA
STEPHEN C. KENNEY*
A RE INSURERS OBLIGATED to indemnify their in-
sureds for punitive damage awards? The answer to this
question has plagued the courts and legal commentators for
years.1 The issue has significant implications for the aviation
industry. It involves fundamental questions concerning the
purposes behind punitive damage awards, public policy con-
siderations, and judicial interpretation of aviation liability in-
surance contracts. As of this writing, twenty-two states have
held that punitive damages rendered directly against an in-
sured are insurable,' while twenty states prohibit such insur-
J.D., Hastings College of Law, University of California, 1972; B.S., The Ohio
State University, 1966. Partner, Maloney, Chase, Fisher and Hurst, San Francisco,
California. Mr. Kenney is a member of the San Francisco, California and American
Bar Associations, and is a pilot practicing aviation and insurance law. The author
would like to thank Ken M. Markowitz (J.D., Golden Gate University, 1982; B.A.,
Northwestern University, 1976; Associate, Maloney, Chase, Fisher and Hurst; mem-
ber of the San Francisco and California Bar Associations) for his valuable legal re-
search and writing assistance.
See, e.g., Comment, Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 431 (1976).
See, e.g., Capitol Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); Price v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Reynolds v.
Willis, 58 Del. 368, 209 A.2d 760 (1965); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers In-
dem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc.
v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); City of Cedar
Rapids v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 1981); Continental Ins.
Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich.
229, 190 N.W. 746 (Mich. 1922); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981); Vrat-
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ance coverage for a variety of reasons.' The remaining eight
states are undecided.4 The lack of uniformity between the
states is apparent.
This article will examine the legal reasoning which has re-
sulted in this disparity as well as the difficulties confronting
insurers who are faced with defending and evaluating punitive
damage claims against their insureds. The aviation industry's
concerns will be given specific attention when appropriate. A
senes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 289 A.2d 66 (1972); Wolff v. General
Casualty Co., 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279
Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923),
cert. dismissed, 264 U.S. 572 (1924); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d
908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964); Dairyland County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ.
App.- Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 137 Vt. 313,
404 A.2d 101 (1979); Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320
(1971); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981); Cieslewicz v. Mut.
Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
' The following four courts do not recognize actions for punitive damages at com-
mon law, thereby negating the question of insurability: Baggett v. Richardson, 473
F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1973) (applying Louisiana law); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799
(1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1969) (applying Massachusetts law); Win-
kler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N.W. 607 (1888); Walker v. Gilman, 25 Wash. 2d 557,
171 P.2d 797 (1946).
Sixteen states recognize punitive damages in some form, but have held such dam-
ages to be uninsurable when directly assessed. See, e.g., City Prod. Corp. v. Globe
Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979); Brown v. W. Casualty &
Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127
Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177
So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d
1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981); Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359 (Me.
1982); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973); Crull v. Gleb, 382
S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 172
N.J. Super. 10, 410 A.2d 696 (1980); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of
Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (1979); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Knight, 34 N.C. App. 96, 237 S.E.2d 341 (1977); Rothman v. Metro-
politan Casualty, 134 Ohio 341, 16 N.E.2d 472 (1938); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa.
Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966). Several federal courts applying the state law have
recognized punitive damages but have held the damages to be uninsurable when the
damages were directly assessed. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523
(10th Cir. 1966); Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 526 F. Supp.
730 (W.D. Okla. 1981); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. 420 F.
Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976). Many state courts allow insurance coverage for punitive
damages which are vicariously assessed against the insured. See, e.g., Sterling Ins. Co.
v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
4 The eight undecided states are Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
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recommended solution to the punitive damage coverage issue
will also be considered. In particular, it finally may be neces-
sary for aviation insurers to incorporate express exclusions for
punitive damage awards into aviation liability policies as a so-
lution to the divergent attitudes of the various state courts
toward the punitive damage coverage issue.5 Any proposed so-
lution to the problem usually is greeted by skepticism, at best,
within the insurance industry. Therefore, some of the poten-
tial consequences associated with adoption of this punitive
damage exclusion proposal also will be explored. It is the in-
tent of this article to highlight at least one viable solution to
the dilemma of whether aviation insurers should provide in-
surance coverage for punitive damage awards.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Punitive Damages Defined
Punitive or exemplary damages "are given to the plaintiff
over and above the full compensation for his injuries, for the
purposes of punishing the defendant, teaching him not to do
it again, and deterring others from following his example.", As
indicated below, certain egregious conduct may serve as the
basis for a punitive damage award. Any attempt, however, to
classify the specific types of conduct necessary to justify such
awards invites imprecision. Professor Prosser best described
the punitive damage concept in the following manner:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always
required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a fraudu-
lent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a con-
scious disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may
be called wilful or wanton. Lacking this element, there is gen-
eral agreement that mere negligence is not enough ..
The nature of the evidence necessary to sustain a punitive
This proposal has been advanced before. For a background discussion, see infra
Section III and note 108.
6 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 9-10 (4th ed. 1971).
Id. at 9-10.
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damage award is uniquely within the province of each individ-
ual jurisdiction. Most states require the presence of oppres-
sive, fraudulent, or malicious conducts to justify punitive
damages. Some jurisdictions hold that gross negligence is suf-
ficient.9 Irrespective of the basis for a punitive damage recov-
ery, all but four of the fifty states allow punitive damage re-
coveries in certain specific situations.10 Cases and statutes
6 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970), which provides in pertinent part:
"In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to
the actual damages may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of pun-
ishing the defendant."
' See Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972);
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
," See supra note 3. Of the jurisdictions that recognize some manner of punitive
damage awards, a specific state's position may depend upon the cause(s) of action
alleged. Some states courts allow recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death ac-
tions. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Cornish, 280 So. 2d 541 (Ala. 1973); Martin v.
United Sec. Serv., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975); Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58,
608 P.2d 861 (1980); Sandifer Oil v. Drew, 220 Miss. 609, 71 So. 2d 752 (1954); Glick
v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965); Gagnier v. Curran Const. Co.,
151 Mont. 468, 443 P.2d 894 (1968); Porter v. Funkhouser, 79 Nev. 273, 382 P.2d 216
(1963); Pratt v. Duck, 28 Tenn. App. 502, 191 S.W.2d 562 (1945); Kelley v. Ohio River
Ry. Co., 58 W. Va. 216, 52 S.E. 520 (1906). Some states allow by statute recovery of
punitive damages in wrongful death actions. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-909
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.130(1), 411.150 (Bob-Merrill 1971); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law, Co-op. Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7:13
(Supp. 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.090 (5)(6) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-A-18-
2(b)(5) (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053(c) (West Supp. 1982); OR. REV.
Stat. § 30.020 (2)(e) (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4673 (Vernon 1952); Some federal courts allow recovery of puni-
tive damages wrongful death actions. See, e.g., Koppinger v. Cullen-Schlitz & Assoc.,
513 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1975); Adams v. Hunter, 343 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
Some state courts specifically preclude recovery of punitive damages in wrongful
death actions: Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968);
Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo. App. 335, 535 P.2d 219 (1975); Reynolds v. Willis, 53 Del.
358, 209 A.2d 760 (1965); Roescher v. Lehigh Acres Dev. Inc., 125 Ga. 431, 188 S.E.2d
154 (1972); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus. Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509
(1975); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 71 Kan. 524,- 81 P. 205
(1905); Vincent v. Morgan's La. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917);
Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393 (1939); Smith v. Gray
Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972); Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440,
134 N.W.2d 611 (1965); Eisert v. Greenburg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d
226 (Minn. 1982); Miller v. Kinglsey, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975); Kern v.
Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967); Kollin v. Shaff, 79 Misc. 2d 49, 359
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1974); Hyyti v. Smith, 67 N.D. 425, 272 N.W. 747 (1937); Cincinnati St.
Ry. Co. v. Altemeirer, 60 Ohio St. 10, 53 N.E. 300 (1899); Palmer v. Philadelphia B. &
W.R. Co., 218 Pa. 114, 66 A. 1127 (1907); Anderson v. Lale, 88 S.D. 111, 216 N.W.2d
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using the terms "wilful", "wanton" or "reckless" conduct are
common, as are the terms "gross" or "aggravated" negli-
gence.1 These descriptive words are used, sometimes synony-
mously, to connote conduct of a nature so egregious as to war-
rant additional damages, not for the sake of compensating the
plaintiff, but for the purpose of punishing the defendant and
deterring similar conduct in the future.1 2
One of the problems with such broad terms is that they
152 (1974); Wilson v. Whittaker, 207 Va. 1032, 154 S.E.2d 124 (1967); Skidmore v.
City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 P. 545 (1926); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.
2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). Four states preclude recovery of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions by statute. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (1973); Hawaii
Rev. Stat. § 663-3 (1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:12 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-
7-1 (1970). Federal courts, interpreting state law have also precluded punitive dam-
ages in wrongful death actions. See, e.g., In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th
Cir. 1980); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); Kennett v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 560 F.2d 456 (1st Cir. 1977); Wallace v. Ener, 521 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1975); Platis v. United States, 288 F.2d 254 (D. Utah 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1009 (10th
Cir. 1969). Two states, Connecticut and Vermont, apparently are undecided on the
issue of whether punitive damages are recoverable in wrongful death actions.
In addition, some states allow recovery of punitive damages in products liability
actions: Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Sturm, Ruger & Co.
v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979); Forest City Machine Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273
Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981); Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d
374, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1981); Am. Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Beerman v. Toro Mfg. Corp., 1 Hawaii App. III, 615 P.2d 749 (1980);
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 166 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 II. 2d
288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970); Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 226 Kan. 681, 602
P.2d 1326 (1979); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Am. Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980); Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921
(1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Newding v.
Kroeger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980). One state, Louisi-
ana, specifically proscribes recovery of punitive damages in products liability actions.
Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 395 So. 2d
310 (1981). Federal courts have also allowed recovery of punitive damages in product
liability actions. See, e.g., Kicklighter v. Nails by Janee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.
1980); Stonehocker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978); d'Hedouville
v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536
F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1967). The remaining jurisdictions apparently are undecided on this issue.
" See Franklin Music Co. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir. 1979);
Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981); Kelsay v. Mo-
torola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1979).
" See, e.g., City Prod. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1979).
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have been applied differently by various state courts."3 These
semantic distinctions can cause considerable confusion. From
the insurer's point of view, it is essential that a particular
state's position be identifiable in order to accurately ascertain
whether, and to what extent, there is exposure for payment of
a punitive damage award which may ultimately be rendered
against the insured.
In most jurisdictions, an insurer is not required to indem-
nify the insured for criminal acts or intentional torts, such as
assault and battery."' Regardless of whether the damages
awarded are deemed to be compensatory or punitive, the
courts have generally held for public policy reasons that an
insurer should not be in a position of insuring against its in-
sured's own conscious wrongdoing. ' Other types of seemingly
intentional conduct, however, generally have been found to be
within broad coverage afforded by liability insurance policies.
Many liability policies, however, contain an express exclusion
prohibiting coverage for damages arising from injuries inten-
tionally inflicted by the insured. 16
Insurers have consistently argued that these express provi-
sions preclude coverage for injuries caused by wilful, wanton
or reckless misconduct, or gross negligence, on the premise
that such misconduct is tantamount to intentionally causing
the injury. This argument has met with little success in the
courts. 17 Numerous opinions addressing the issue have con-
cluded, as did the court in Crull v. Gleb,18 that the terms "in-
tentional" and "wanton and reckless" are not synonymous for
purposes of determining insurance coverage for punitive dam-
ages. The Crull court reasoned that "wanton or reckless" acts
denoted indifference to the rights of others by the doing of
intentional acts without regard for their consequences.1"
18 Id. at 40-41, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500.
34 See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir.
1962).
See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
" See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1238, 1240 (1965).
'7 See id. at 1245.
382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
Id. at 21-22.
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"Wanton or reckless" acts must be distinguished from acts
undertaken with the express intention of causing injury to
others. While intentional acts of the insured should not be
covered, the Crull opinion pointed out that damages arising
out of mere "wanton or reckless" acts such as reckless opera-
tion of an automobile, may still fall far short of the traditional
concept of intentional wrongdoing,20 such as assault and bat-
tery, as illustrated in Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Thornton."1 The courts
have consistently held that injuries resulting from gross or
wanton negligence, such as an accident caused by an intoxi-
cated driver, can be distinguished from those which result
from intentional conduct.2 These courts repeatedly have re-
jected the contention that the insured's acts had to have been
wilful, rather than negligent, simply because punitive damages
were awarded.2 3 One court stated that acceptance of such a
contention would result in the illogical holding that the more
outrageous the reckless conduct, the more likely it would be
that the insurer would escape liability.24 The court felt that
this result would be contrary to one of the fundamental pur-
poses of liability insurance, which is to protect innocent third
party victims.2 5
Further, the courts have generally distinguished between
"intentional acts" and "intentional injuries" when construing
liability insurance policies to provide broad coverage. In Trav-
elers Indemnity Co. v. Hood,'6 two insurance policies were in-
volved, one of which insured against liability for bodily injury
"caused by accident and arising out of the ownerhip, mainte-
nance or use" of the vehicle. The plaintiff had obtained a
judgment for her husband's wrongful death resulting from the
wilful and wanton misconduct of the insured in unlawfully
'o Id. at 22.
" 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
See, e.g., General Casualty Co. v. Woodby 238 F.2d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 1956).
" See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 320, 324 (1968).
Thornton, 244 F.2d at 827.
28 See 244 F.2d at 827.
" 110 Ga. App. 855, 140 S.E.2d 68 (1964).
27 Id. at 70.
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drag-racing on a public highway. The insurers argued that the
policies did not cover liability for the insured's wilful and
wanton misconduct because it is contrary to public policy to
indemnify a person against such misconduct. The Travelers
Indemnity Co. court disagreed, holding that injuries "caused
by accident," as the term was used in the insurance policy,
would include injuries caused without the intent or design to
injure.2 Only injuries caused with the intent or design to in-
jure would shield the insurer from ultimate liability. Thus,
even though the insured may have intended his acts (to drag-
race), he did not intend to injure his victim. Therefore, such
conduct was "accidental" within the terms of the coverage.
The Travelers Indemnity Co. court recognized that for pur-
poses of criminal or tort law, such conduct might be construc-
tively intentional. However, for purposes of interpreting an in-
surance contract, intentional acts (i.e., unlawful drag-racing)
must be distinguished from intentional injuries (i.e., conscious
assault and battery with an automobile or dangerous
instrumentality) .,9
The concept of awarding damages over and above compen-
sation to the injured party for purposes of punishment, exam-
ple and deterrence is by no means new.30 It dates back at least
to the early English common law. As early as 1851, the United
States Supreme Court stated that recovery of punitive dam-
ages "is a well-established principle of the common law," rec-
ognized in repeated judicial decisions for more than a
century.81
Although punitive damages have been a viable concept for
years, insurers, the courts, and modern practitioners are now
becoming increasingly aware of their prevalence in contempo-
rary litigation. It is an unusual complaint that fails to seek
punitive damages, particularly when wealthy defendants can
be found.12 This situation has raised serious concern within
I /d.
I9 d.
30 For a discussion of the historical origins of punitive damages, see Levit, Punitive
Damages: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 688 INS. L.J. 257 (1980).
*1 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
" Levit, supra note 30, at 259.
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the legal profession and has been the subject of considerable
comment.33 One of the practical concerns is the concept that
when punitive damages are an issue, evidence of the defen-
dant's wealth is admissible on the theory that proper punish-
ment can only be rendered if the culpable defendant feels a
financial pinch from the award. 4 Such financial evidence can
be very prejudicial to the insured defendant because it may
have a tendency to influence the jury to increase the compen-
satory damage award on the theory that a wealthy defendant
can afford it even if punitive damages are ultimately denied.
In addition, evidence of the defendant's significant net worth
conceivably could cause the jury to find liability in a doubtful
case in spite of cautionary instructions to the contrary from
the court. 5 Accordingly, insurers understandably have been
attempting to deal with the many problems raised by punitive
damage allegations against their insureds, including the inevi-
table coverage questions as set forth below.
B. Nature of the Controversy
Various courts apparently maintain very divergent views on
the issue of whether liability insurance provides coverage
when punitive damages are awarded against an insured." On
this issue, there are several disparate positions which are fol-
lowed in the various forums. One prevelant position is that
punitive damages are not insurable for public policy reasons.
States that adopt this position follow the leading and fre-
quently cited opinion in Northwestern National Casualty Co.
v. McNulty."7 The McNulty court reasoned that because pu-
nitive damages are imposed to punish the wrongdoer and to
deter similar conduct, this purpose could not be achieved if
"h See generally, J. GHIARDi & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
(1981). [hereinafter cited as J. GHIARDI].
3, See, e.g., City Prod. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 41-42, 151
Cal. Rptr. 494, 500 (1979).
" Levit,supra note 30, at 261.
, See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 353 (1968), for a collection of representative cases from
various jurisdictions indicating the lack of uniformity on the issue of the insurability
of punitive damages.
3- 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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the culpable party were allowed to shift the designated per-
sonal punishment to an innocent insurer.3 8 The McNulty case
involved an intoxicated driver who crashed into another vehi-
cle and left the accident scene. The jury awarded the plaintiff
$37,500 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive
damage award. 9 On appeal, the insurer argued that the lan-
guage of the policy did not cover punitive damage awards.
The McNulty court never even addressed the insurer's argu-
ment, stating: "We find it unnecessary to construe the con-
tract; we hold that should a policy specifically provide for
such coverage, it would contravene public policy. '40 The opin-
ion noted that punishment and deterrence were the most
widely accepted justifications for the imposition of punitive
damages. Accordingly, the McNulty court reasoned:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom inconsistent with the establishment of sanc-
tions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance
against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of
public policy. The same public policy should invalidate any
contract of insurance against the civil punishment that puni-
tive damages represent.'"
The McNulty court was convinced that,
[if a] person were permitted to shift the burden to an insur-
ance company, punitive damages would serve no useful pur-
pose. Such damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his in-
jury, since compensatory damages already have made the
plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing the insur-
ance company; it has done no wrong.'2
The Court astutely recognized that if insurers were held to
cover punitive damages, the liability would actually be passed
along to all policyholders through increased premiums. "Soci-
ety would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed
' Id. at 440.
O, Id. at 443.




by the insured. '43
In states that preclude insurance coverage for punitive
damages, the McNulty "public policy" reasoning strongly sup-
ports the desired result. If punitive damages are truly im-
posed to punish and deter, coverage for the insured would
neither punish the culpable party, nor give credibility to the
deterrent purpose.
On the other side of the insurability issue are the courts
that justify coverage for punitive damages. The leading deci-
sion allowing coverage is Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Insurance Co.,"e a case which also involved an intoxicated
driver. The Lazenby court recognized the serious conse-
quences associated with traffic injuries and death caused by
socially irresponsible drivers, but was not persuaded that
prohibiting insureds from being reimbursed by their insurers
for punitive damages would accomplish the result of deterring
the misconduct.4" The Lazenby opinion noted that even the
numerous criminal sanctions attached to such wrongful acts
had produced little deterrent effect.4 7 The Lazenby court
found that the insurance policy language provided for puni-
tive damage coverage. It was concluded that public policy
equates with public good. According to the Lazenby rationale,
the public good is not harmed by a private contract between
an insurer and its insured."8
Numerous decisions have followed the Lazenby pro-cover-
age position.' 9 Some courts simply stress that particular insur-
43 Id. at 441.
4 The McNulty reasoning appears in numerous subsequent cases. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966); Beaver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.,
95 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1964); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197
A.2d 591 (1964); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d
218, 397 N.E.2d 737 (1979); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793
(1966).
45 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
6 383 S.W.2d at 5.
47 Id.
48 Id.
, Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972);
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho
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ance policy language actually provides coverage for punitive
damages under a strict construction of the contractual
terms.'0 Other courts have recognized that competing "public
policy" considerations permit coverage for punitive damage
awards. For example, on the theory that the court could not
adopt a "new rule of public policy that would invalidate both
existing and future contracts," the Oregon Supreme Court
held that it is not against public policy to insure against puni-
tive damages. 61
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court held in Price v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co."2 that punitive damages are
covered under a liability policy. The court reasoned that "Ari-
zona has more than one public policy .... One such public
policy is that an insurance company which admittedly took a
premium for covering all liability for damages, should honor
its obligation.""3 This theme is consistent with well-settled
case law construing insurance contracts in favor of the policy-
holder in disputed coverage situations. 4 When, as in the typi-
cal case, a liability insurance policy purports "to pay on behalf
of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages . . . ," the courts generally con-
strue such language to embrace punitive damage awards even
in states where public policy is held to preclude such insur-
ance coverage.'5
In Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallgren,'6
a Texas appellate court upheld a ruling requiring an insurer
501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); City of Cedar Rapids v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 304
N.W.2d 228 (Iowa 1981); Anthony v. Frith, 394 So. 2d 867 (Miss. 1981); Hensley v.
Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).
See, e.g., Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
" Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. at 205-06, 567 P.2d at 1016.
108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972).
I ld. at 487, 502 P.2d at 524 (emphasis added).
See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 320, 323-29 (1968).
6' See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d
218, 397 N.E.2d 737 (1979), in which the highest court in New York held that puni-
tive damages were uninsurable under a liability policy for public policy reasons de-
spite the acknowledgment that the language of the typical liability policy is broad
enough to cover both compensatory and punitive damages and would be so inter-
preted by the average policyholder. Id. at 743-44.
6 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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to pay a punitive damage award on a rather unique theory.
After acknowledging earlier decisions construing customary
insurance policy language as providing coverage for punitive
damage awards, the Dairyland County court noted that the
authority for such language was the Texas State Insurance
Commission.5 7 The court reasoned that because public author-
ity had decreed the language and presumably the effect of its
application, coverage for punitive damages could not be
against public policy per se.58
At present, the controversy remains unsettled. Punitive
damage awards are covered under liability policies in some
states, while other states forbid such coverage.59 If any trend
is recognizable, it is that the pro-coverage position is receiving
more support.60
C. Impact Upon the Aviation Industry
"What would be slight negligence in the operation of an au-
tomobile might be gross negligence with disastrous results in
the operation of an airplane."" This sobering truism needs
little, if any, amplification. As noted earlier,6 gross negligence
can indeed give rise to punitive damages.
Perhaps more alarming is the rapid increase of punitive
damage awards in product liability cases.'e Actions in which
claimants have sought to recover punitive damages on product
' Id. at 342.
68 Id. at 342-43. See also Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238
Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977), in which the Georgia Supreme Court applied similar
reasoning to support its holding that punitive damages are insurable under liability
policy language authorized by the state legislature. Id. at 332, 232 S.E.2d at 924.
" The authors wish to emphasize that the foregoing discussion applies specifically
to punitive damages assessed directly against a wrongdoer-insured. The decisions are
often quite different when punitive damages are awarded on a vicarious liability the-
ory. The courts are much more inclined to permit insurance coverage for punitive
damages when the insured is not personally responsible for the alleged misconduct.
See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343, 351-52 (1968).
60 See generally J.GHIARDI supra note 33.
Walthew v. Davis, 201 Va. 557, 559, 111 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1960).
e See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
6' Compare Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021, 1022 (1970) (containing few reported cases)
with Annot., 13 A.L.R.4th 52, 57-62 (1982) (a superseding annotation indicating a
dramatic increase of reported cases). See also, Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product
Liability Cases, 15 FoRuM 117 (1979).
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liability theories now involve a very broad range of products,
from aircraft"4 and motor vehicles 5 to household items,6"
drugs and cosmetics67 and various other products.6  It is now
well accepted that, "[a]n aircraft manufacturer is subject to
essentially the same legal duties as is a manufacturer of any
other product.' It can hardly be disputed, however, that air-
craft product failures due to design or manufacturing defects
raise concerns of the gravest magnitude because of the poten-
tial for unparalleled disaster. Accordingly, "[ais is evident
from the enormous jury verdicts for punitive damages re-
turned against manufacturers in the last few years, aircraft
manufacturers face very substantial financial exposure that
was unheard of, in most cases, at the time the product was
designed and manufactured." 0
While most reported decisions involving significant punitive
damage awards fortunately are not aviation related71 enough
cases exist to sufficiently alert aircraft related manufacturers
and insurers of the potential for these large awards. A jury
award of over $20,000,000 against a general aviation manufac-
turer in a California products liability case is very familiar to
See, e.g., Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); Vollert
v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D.C. Hawaii 1975).
65 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981);
Ford Motor Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 374, 172 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1981);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
" Drayton v. Jeffee Chemical Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (liquid drain
cleaner caused facial burns on child); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109,
253 N.E.2d 636 (1969) (liquid drain cleaner caused the plaintiff's blindness).
6 Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980); Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973).
6 Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 So. 332 (1937) (motor oil); Barth v.
B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (automobile
tires); Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 226 Kan. 681, 602 P.2d 1326 (1979)
(ladder).
" Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Dam-
ages: The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. Am L. & CoM. 595 n.2 (1974).
I0 d. at 619.
=' See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 777, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 361 (1981), which is one of a number of cases upholding substantial punitive
damages against defendant Ford Motor Company for injuries sustained as a result of
rear-end Pinto collisions, in which evidence disclosed that Ford management knew of
fire danger from rear-end collisions based upon crash-test data but failed to remedy
the defect.
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the aviation industry.2 In another California case,7 the jury
rendered an award of over $10,000,000 in punitive damages
against an aviation manufacturer.
In today's consumer-oriented social climate, even air carri-
ers are subject to punitive damages. For example, denied-
boarding cases have resulted in punitive damage awards
where the air carrier's conduct is held sufficiently reprehensi-
ble. 74 In any event, the concept of punitive damages in avia-
tion cases must be regarded as providing serious potential in-
creased economic exposure for aircraft related insureds and,
in certain states, their insurers.75 There are no distinguishing
qualities inherent in the aviation industry to render it im-
mune from punitive damage awards. Nor can it ignore the po-
tential impact of such damages. There are those who have ar-
gued fervently against the idea of punitive damages,7
specifically when they are sought in product liability cases.77
Nonetheless, the punitive damage threat remains a viable re-
ality in contemporary tort litigation.
Of primary concern is the question of who will pay the ulti-
mate punitive damage award: the insured or his insurer? The
typical aviation liability policy promises to pay, on behalf of
the insured, all sums which the insured shall become legally
72 Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974),
(punitive damages awarded to decedents' heirs were precluded on statutory grounds).
73 Rosendin v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 15 A.T.L.A. Newsletter 103 (Cal. Super Ct.
Santa Clara Mar. 8, 1972) (unpublished opinion).
74 Archibald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972);
Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
71 See supra note 2.
71 See Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, in THE CASE AGAINST Pu-
NITIVE DAMAGES (1969); Kircher, Products Liability-The Defense Position, 44 INS.
COUN. J. 276, 301 (1977).
7 Synman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases, 44 INS.
COUN. J. 402 (1977); Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases,
61 MARQ. L. REV. 245 (1977). These commentators argue very convincingly that puni-
tive damages are incompatible with recovery under a strict liability theory. Under a
strict liability theory it is the condition of a producL introduced into the market place
that determines liability, and the manufacturer's conduct is irrelevant. But if the
plaintiff seeks recovery of punitive damages, then the manufacturer's conduct is rele-
vant because recovery is predicated upon proof of malicious, oppressive, fraudulent or
wilful misconduct involving the design or marketing of the product.
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obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury.78 As
previously noted, this type of language repeatedly has been
held to include coverage for punitive damages in those states
where public policy is not offended by such coverage. 9 When
an action seeking punitive damages against an aviation related
defendant is filed, the determination of who must pay any re-
sulting punitive damage award turns on whether the state law
applicable to the particular case adopts the pro-coverage
position.80
A recent, very tragic, and much publicized case, In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill.,1 helps to exemplify the di-
lemma facing aviation insurers who are confronted with puni-
tive damage issues. On May 25, 1979, an American Airlines
DC-10, designed and built by McDonnell-Douglas, crashed af-
ter takeoff from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, kill-
ing all 271 persons aboard the aircraft as well as persons on
the ground.82 Both American Airlines and McDonnell-Douglas
were sued by multiple claimants seeking compensatory and
punitive damages. The claims for punitive damages were
eventually disallowed after the Court of Appeals completed a
lengthy choice of law analysis."' The Chicago Air Crash court
determined that under the applicable Illinois law, punitive
damages were not recoverable in wrongful death actions."
The determination to apply Illinois law relieved the aviation
defendants and their insurers from exposure to potentially
significant punitive damage awards. Most importantly, this
determination had nothing to do with the merits of the cases
against the defendants. The choice of law determination was
dispositive.
If, hypothetically, the Chicago Air Crash court had found
that the laws of another state which permitted recovery of pu-
76 See generally J.GHIARDI, supra note 33.
71 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See also Carroway v. Johnson, 245
S.C. 200, 202, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1976).
80 See supra notes 2 & 3.
S 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
Id. at 604.
Id. at 630.
84 Id. at 629.
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nitive damages in wrongful death actions, should have been
applied, 5 the result might have been different. In actuality,
the laws of seven states (Illinois, Missouri, California,
Oklahoma, New York, Texas and Hawaii) were potentially ap-
plicable.8 6 This type of confusing situation is not unusual in
aviation cases, because the aviation industry plays an integral
role in contemporary interstate commerce, and aviation prod-
ucts are likely to be designed, manufactured, repaired or used
in every jurisdiction, including foreign countries. If punitive
damages had been recoverable against American Airlines or
McDonnell-Douglas (assuming, for the sake of illustration,
that sufficient egregious conduct could have been alleged and
proved) in the Chicago Air Crash case, the result would be
enormous potential exposure, due to both the number of
claims and the significant corporate wealth of the respective
defendants.
The potential liability of the defendants or their insurers in
this situation depends upon which state law applies.8 7 If, hy-
pothetically, the Chicago Air Crash court had determined
that the laws of Texas or Missouri were alternatively applica-
ble, additional confusion might have resulted. For example,
both Texas and Missouri allow recovery of punitive damage
awards in wrongful death actions.s Texas also permits insur-
ance coverage for punitive damage awards.18 If Texas law had
been applicable, under a standard aviation liability policy the
aviation insurers would have been obliged to pay any ultimate
punitive damage award against American Airlines or McDon-
nell-Douglas. Missouri law, on the other hand, forbids insur-
ance coverage for punitive damages as violative of public pol-
66 Indeed, the district court had refused to grant defendant McDonnell-Douglas'
motion to strike the punitive damage claims because Missouri law permitted the
plaintiffs to state causes of action against McDonnell-Douglas for punitive damages,
and Missouri law was held to be applicable because Missouri was McDonnell-Doug-
las' principal place of business. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 500 F.
Supp. 1044, 1050 (D.C. 11. 1980), aff'd, 644 F. 2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
" 644 F.2d at 605.
' See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 10.
9 See Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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icy.'0 If, hypothetically, the Chicago Air Crash court had
decided to apply Missouri law for some choice of law reason,
the aviation defendants themselves would have been liable for
any eventual punitive damage award.
The hypothetical extension of the Chicago Air Crash case
communicates the complexities of the punitive damage cover-
age issue in addition to the element of chance associated with
the application of punitive damage rules in aviation cases. As
noted, in the Chicago Air Crash case Illinois law was deemed
controlling because Illinois was the place of injury." From the
aviation defendants' viewpoint it can only be considered for-
tuitous that such a catastrophe, having happened at all, fol-
lowed takeoff from O'Hare (Illinois) rather than from an air-
port in Texas or Missouri or any other jurisdiction where
punitive damages potentially are recoverable in wrongful
death actions.9 2 Similarly, if one person had survived the
crash, the person could have asserted a claim for punitive
damages against the defendants under a personal injury cause
of action.98
Before examining the proposed solution to this dilemma,
one final point merits consideration. Under the provisions of
the typical liability policy, the insurer has the duty to defend
its insured against claims arising under the policy.' When pu-
nitive damages are alleged, a very serious conflict of interest
can materialize between the insurer and its insured. In the hy-
pothetical extension of the Chicago Air Crash case, for illus-
trative purposes it was assumed that Texas or Missouri law
might have been held applicable. In a situation in which re-
covery of punitive damages seems likely, the insured aviation
defendants would undoubtedly prefer to defend the action ac-
Crull v. Gieb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
'l 644 F.2d at 615-16.
" See supra note 10 for a comprehensive list of jurisdictions where punitive dam-
ages are recoverable in wrongful death actions.
93 A crash survivor would not be precluded from asserting a personal cause of ac-
tion for punitive damages as are decedents' heirs under many wrongful death statutes
which limit recovery to specified compensatory damages. See, e.g., In re Paris Air
Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980).
' See Public Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 425 N.E.2d 810, 430
N.Y.S.2d 72 (1981).
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cording to the law of a forum that permits insurance coverage
for punitive damages. Because Texas permits such coverage,
these insureds would have incentive to argue that Texas law
should be applied.
Conversely, the aviation insurers probably would prefer to
defend the action in a forum where insurance coverage for pu-
nitive damages violates public policy in order to prevent the
insurer from ultimately indemnifying the insured. When this
type of choice of law problem arises, a significant conflict of
interest arises between the insurer and its insured. The in-
sured's pecuniary interests are potentially susceptible of being
sacrificed for those of the insurer because the insurer's duty to
defend generally includes the right to conduct and to control
the defense.96 Under these circumstances, the insurer often
undertakes a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights,
whereby the insurer informs its insured that it has reserved
the right to deny coverage for any eventual punitive damage
award and that the insured has the right to retain indepen-
dent counsel, at the insured's expense, to participate in the
defense of the punitive damages claims. Obviously, this con-
flict does not assist in promoting harmonious business rela-
tions between the insurer and its insured and should ideally
be avoided if possible.
9 Generally, under liability policy provisions, defense counsel is selected by the
insurer pursuant to its obligation to defend the insured. In Parker v. Agricultural Ins.
Co., the court ruled that the insured was entitled to select defense counsel at the
insurer's expense. 109 Misc. 2d 678, 681, 440 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
Seven separate actions had been filed against the insured following an explosion at
the insured's premises. Five of these actions charged the insured with willful and
wanton misconduct and sought punitive damages in excess of $160 million. New York
forbids insurance coverage for punitive damages directly assessed. Therefore, the
court found that a conflict of interest existed on the part of the insurer because the
insurer might seek to minimize compensatory awards at the expense of the potential
punitive damage award for which it could not be held liable. Id. Noting that the
insurer's duty to defend is normally accompanied by a right to control the litigation,
the court held that the insured's interest was sufficiently greater than the insurer's so
as to warrant the insured's selection of counsel, notwithstanding the general rule. Id.
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II. THE CASE By CASE EVALUATION UNDER THE PRESENT
SYSTEM
The cases involving insurability of punitive damages are so
numerous and varied that any attempt to conclusively catego-
rize states according to those that permit and those that for-
bid insurance coverage can be quite misleading. As noted pre-
viously, Missouri's public policy precludes liability insurance
coverage for punitive damages assessed directly against the in-
sured." In most cases involving liability policies, such as those
for automobiles, homes, businesses and aircraft, this would be
an accurate assessment of Missouri law. In Colson v. Lloyd's
of London97 , however, the court was confronted with a liabil-
ity insurance policy issued to a local law enforcement agency
covering "loss by reason of liability imposed by law upon the
insured by reason of any false arrest." 8 After the court con-
sidered Missouri law in an action against the insurer, the
court held that punitive damages arising out of a false arrest
were covered under the policy despite the public policy of
Missouri, which precluded such coverage." The Colson court
reasoned that the competing public policy of encouraging effi-
cient law enforcement controlled. 00 This case illustrates the
importance of evaluating each case based on its own unique
facts and issues, an approach which is presently being fol-
lowed by the insurance industry as well as by the courts but
with some inherent difficulties.
When an action is filed containing a claim for punitive dam-
ages, any evaluation must begin with a realistic appraisal of
the alleged misconduct. The insurer must determine whether
the alleged acts or omissions if proven, could give rise to an
award of punitive damages. If the action could result in such
an award, several important criteria must be considered.
At the outset, the language of the insurance policy should
be thoroughly reviewed. Unless the policy expressly and in
See supra notes 3, 90.
' 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1968).
" Id. at 43, 44.
" Id. at 45.
I" Id. at 47.
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plain language excludes coverage for punitive damages, the
courts are likely to construe the language to provide coverage
in those states that allow such coverage.1"' Two other consid-
erations are paramount: (1) where the case is filed, and (2) the
nature of the causes of action alleged. From the defendant's
standpoint an ideal forum would be one where punitive dam-
ages are either forbidden entirely (which is rare) or prohibited
due to the specific cause of action alleged. For example, Kan-
sas and California are among the states that allow recovery of
punitive damages in products liability actions. 02 If the suit is
based on wrongful death allegations, however, punitive dam-
age awards are prohibited. 03 Thus, from the limited stand-
point of an insurer concerned about the possibility of indem-
nifying the insured for a punitive damage award, California
and Kansas might be ideal forums in wrongful death product
liability actions because the claimants would be limited to a
recovery of compensatory damages.
Under the present system, the insurer must look for
changes in the state approaches to punitive damages and cov-
erage problems because these issues have not been resolved in
many jurisdictions. For example, those jurisdictions that pro-
hibit punitive damage awards in wrongful death actions, while
allowing punitive awards under other theories, have come
under increasing attack from the plaintiffs' bar. The creative
plaintiffs' attorneys point out that in these jurisdictions the
conscious or grossly negligent wrongdoer is spared the addi-
tional punishment of a punitive damage award if he or she
happens to kill, rather than merely injure, the victim. 0 4
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGE EXCLUSION CLAUSE As A SOLUTION
The application of diverse state laws to a "case by case"
analysis of the punitive damages coverage issue has resulted
in anything but uniformity among the various jurisdictions. It
101 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 10.
103 Id.
104 Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases-A Debate, 11 FORUM
50, 53 (1975).
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seems unlikely that the courts or the various state legislatures
will reverse the historical pattern.'0' Presently, insurers deal-
ing with identical factual circumstances face exposure for pu-
nitive damages in some states while not in others, 06 with the
ultimate determination left in large part to chance or the
whim of a local court attempting to deal with complex choice
of law rules.
A practical legal solution to the problem exists. Insurers
could prevent many punitive damages coverage disputes by
simply excluding such coverage in plain, unequivocal and un-
ambiguous terms under the "Exclusions" section in each pol-
icy. 07 This idea is not entirely novel 08 but is certainly deserv-
ing of renewed attention. Aviation insurers would be wise to
consider utilizing the following unequivocal policy language to
eliminate the doubt on the punitive damage coverage issue:
ExCLUSIONS
It is hereby agreed that coverage under this policy shall not
apply to or cover:
1. Any award of punitive and/or exemplary damages.
The positive aspects of such a proposal are numerous. Since
the states have failed to approach the insurability issue with a
108 See Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343, 350-52 (1968).
'" See supra notes 2, 3, 10 and accompanying text.
,0? The need for clear, concise language in insurance policies must be recognized
because the courts routinely construe ambiguous language in favor of the insured.
See, e.g., Prive v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522
(1972); Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437, 296
P.2d 801, 809 (1956); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W.Va. 1981); Cies-
lewicz v. Mut. Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 167 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
"IB In November 1977, the Insurance Services Office suggested a policy endorse-
ment stating specifically that coverage for punitive damages is excluded from prop-
erty and liability insurance contracts. The suggested endorsement was withdrawn in
March, 1978, following substantial pressure from industry and consumer groups.
Keen competition in the insurance industry does not encourage insurers to expressly
exclude punitive damage coverage.
The suggestion had been advanced in 1978 in California prior to the decision in
City Prod. Corp. v. Glove Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979)
(holding punitive damages uninsurable as against public policy). See Comment, The
Exclusion Clause: A Simple and Genuine Solution to the Insurance for Punitive
Damages Controversy, 12 U.S.F.L. REv. 743, 759-68 (1978).
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goal toward uniformity, aviation insurers could utilize the pu-
nitive damage exclusion to achieve the desired result. Litiga-
tion between insurers and insureds over coverage for punitive
damages conceivably could be reduced because the nature and
extent of coverage would be expressly delineated at the forma-
tion of the insurance contract. Both parties would know the
precise limits of the negotiated coverage. If the insured were
to insist upon coverage for punitive damages, the insurer
could structure the premium to reflect its increased expo-
sure. 10 9 Also, corporate insureds could purchase liability poli-
cies which specifically provide coverage for vicariously as-
sessed punitive damages arising out of the conduct of the
corporation's employees. Such coverage is generally not offen-
sive to public policy.1"'
Additionally, the proposed exclusion would reduce potential
conflicts of interest between aviation insurers and their in-
sureds. As noted earlier, the aviation industry is so pervasive
in modern society that lawsuits against air carriers, manufac-
turers and aviation related insureds are likely to be filed in
every jurisdiction. Certain actions properly could be brought
in more than one forum. Where one available forum permits
insurance coverage for punitive damages and others forbid
such coverage, 1 the interests of the insurer and its insured
are in conflict concerning where each would prefer to have the
action defended. Use of the proposed punitive damage exclu-
sion would assist in eliminating such conflicts because both
the insurer and its insured would be aware from the outset of
the coverage limitation concerning punitive damages. Conse-
quently, any choice of law questions would not be influenced
by punitive damage coverage considerations. In turn, defense
attorneys could concentrate their efforts on choosing optimum
available forums based upon more practical considerations,
such as availability of witnesses, convenience to the litigants,
pretrial publicity and size of previous jury awards.
'" Note that such coverage would only apply in those states where public policy is
not offended by insurance coverage for punitive damages. See supra note 2.
110 See supra notes 3 and 59.
" See supra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the proposed exclusion clause would prevent avia-
tion insurers from being exposed to potentially large and
wholly speculative risks. This could result in reduced premi-
ums that reflect only the more realistic, calculable risks asso-
ciated with coverage for compensatory damages. All consum-
ers of liability insurance should welcome such a result. In
cases where punitive damages are truly warranted, the culpa-
ble party would be punished, not the insurer. This approach
would seem to benefit all aviation policyholders because the
insurer's potential exposure for punitive damage awards is
often reflected in increased future premiums. If the insurer is
compelled to pay such an award, the punitive purpose of the
award is lost. In effect, society ends up punishing itself, while
the wrongdoer-insured escapes unscathed. A concise and une-
quivocal punitive damage exclusion could eliminate this po-
tential unjust result.
IV. CONCLUSION
From a legal perspective, the idea of expressly excluding in-
surance coverage for punitive damages is appealing. Use of the
proposed exclusion would serve to promote the punishment
and deterrence purposes behind punitive damages because the
actual wrongdoer would be punished, thereby setting an ex-
ample for others inclined to such conduct. If insurers are
forced to cover punitive damage awards, the deterrent func-
tion is lost. Such broad coverage might even encourage other
insureds to pursue questionable courses of conduct in reliance
on the availability of insurance coverage should their conduct
result in a punitive damage award.
Moreover, adoption of the proposed exclusion would foster
better understanding between insurers and their insureds
which would result in fewer controversies and less litigation
over punitive damage coverage disputes. In cases where multi-
ple forums are available, potential conflicts between the in-
surer and its insured over the proper forum in which to liti-
gate the punitive damage claims would be minimized.
As a legal solution to a difficult problem, the proposed ex-
clusion clause offers genuine benefits. There are, however,
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those who would object to its adoption for business and mar-
keting reasons, rather than pure legal considerations. Insur-
ance consumers usually seek to procure the broadest coverage
available. Any limitations on coverage are greeted with disfa-
vor. In the aviation industry, the consumers tend to be very
sophisticated purchasers of insurance, such as aircraft manu-
facturers and distributors. The insurance industry itself is so
highly competitive that these consumers are often able to
"shop" for the best deal. Insurers do not wish to jeopardize
existing or prospective business relationships by including un-
reasonable limitations or exclusions in their policies. If insur-
ers, and particularly aviation insurers, maintain their reluc-
tance to adopt the recommended exclusionary language, they
can only hope that the next major punitive damage award is
not assessed against one of their insureds in a forum that per-
mits broad coverage. If such an award is ultimately rendered,
insurers may lose the ability to control their potential expo-
sure, a result which would certainly fail to qualify as a sound
underwriting practice.
1983]

Commentary

